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George Osborne was a purveyor of machonomics, an approach to
economic policy-making revolving around seemingly bottomless
reserves of macho self-confidence, writes Matthew Watson. Here
he argues that Osborne modelled himself in this way on the optimal
policy-maker of the so-called time consistency problem of abstract
economic theory.
George Osborne was always accused of having lived a charmed life by those of his
Conservative Party colleagues who did not always take him to their heart. Perhaps true to
form, then, he was able to take comfortably in his stride the really rather savage dismissal
as Chancellor of the Exchequer meted out to him by Theresa May. Almost immediately
he resurfaced as editor of the London Evening Standard.  Despite being deprived of the
capacity to continue making economic policy as he saw fit, he nevertheless retains a
platform for intervening into public debates about the economy. His editorial pieces have
consistently championed continuity with his policy legacy, warning in often grave
language of the dangers that lie ahead if the new Chancellor appears to be any less
laser-focused than he was on attempting to squeeze out of the economy all excess debt,
excess borrowing, and excess public spending.
As a result, Osborne still matters to the process of UK macroeconomic policy-making.
His views on maintaining the austerity status quo were always likely to make the news,
seeing as his new job hands him responsibility for writing it. Moreover, the often strident
tones in which he expresses himself only accentuate the newsworthiness of his presence
in debates. He has stuck religiously to his infamous declaration from early in his time at
Number 11 that there could be no Plan B to austerity. Osborne as Chancellor stood not
only for a particular type of macroeconomic policy but also for a particular style of top-
down ‘expert’ macroeconomic policy-making. Osborne as editor of the London Evening
Standard still does so.
His biographers point to a keen student of economic theory, someone who was prepping
himself for holding the Treasury portfolio long before David Cameron rewarded him with
it. Whilst still Shadow Chancellor, Osborne paraded his knowledge of economic theory in
front of audiences of economists, telling people who he knew would get the reference
that the problem facing Britain was one that was well described in the specialist ‘time
consistency’ literature.
Wrapping himself in the image of the optimal policy-maker derived from that literature, he
insisted that the public finances could only be restored to health if a politician could be
found who would announce a strict counter-deficit plan, before then sticking to it in the
face of what the literature says is always likely to be an increasingly hostile public.
Osborne routinely offered himself as just such a politician when still in opposition, and in
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government he did everything he could to enforce the impression that this was the only
type of policy-maker he could ever be expected to be. Even repeatedly missing his own
interim targets on the road to budgetary balance was insufficient for him to begin flirting
in public with a Plan B; the macho mask of infinite self-assurance was never allowed to
slip.
Something very interesting emerges when now retrospectively reading back-to-back all of
Osborne’s set-piece speeches as Chancellor. The academic literature on the time
consistency problem presents a solution to the difficulty of getting finance ministers to
commit to a policy course that they know will spread pain within society. This is to appoint
a specifically ‘conservative’ policy-maker, defined formally as a person who does not
share the general population’s understanding of the shape of the social welfare function.
In plain language, this is someone who is prepared to cut social spending much more
drastically than the median voter would ever consider doing.
In speech after speech from 2010 onwards, Osborne signalled not merely that this was
his preferred style of policy-making. More pointedly, a pattern is very much evident as
time and again he invoked the theoretical solution to the time consistency problem to say
that he was uniquely placed to continue acting as the guardian of the path to budgetary
balance. He was the one politician, his speeches insisted, who had established the
reputation for being able to rise above the political fray to maintain the merely technical
course that turns a deficit-riddled economy into a zero-deficit one.
The result is that the UK was governed macroeconomically between 2010 and 2016
through a commitment to what might be called ‘machonomics’. Important as they are in
their own right, this term is designed to indicate more than that women were required to
shoulder a disproportionate burden of Osborne’s austerity programme and that this
occurred with his Treasury team neglecting to complete supposedly statutory gender
impact assessments of the new policy course. What is generally in any case the
gendered nature of macroeconomic policy outcomes veered into the overtly macho in
Osborne’s case due to his willingness to parade his self-denying ordinance as a political
virtue to be found only in people like him. Towards the end of his tenure as Chancellor
he seemed never more comfortable than when saying that not simply was his preferred
style of policy-making essential to good macroeconomic governance, but also that he
alone could be trusted to deliver it. Machonomics captures the generic condition that
arises when a finance minister convinces themselves that they are the only person who
can see what is right for the economy.
Osborne himself may not have survived the change of Prime Minister following the UK’s
EU referendum.  But his style of policy-making and, therefore, his influence over policy
remain a persistent elephant in the Treasury room. Gone are the really rather unmissable
allusions to the specifically conservative policy-maker who solves the time consistency
problem in the abstract, but not the tendency towards machonomics to which the
specifically conservative policy-maker points. We are thus trapped in something akin to a
machonomics Frankenstein’s Monster scenario, in which the inventor’s life has been
turned upside-down by his creation but the monster itself is still on the loose. This
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unstable hiatus will continue to take on the characteristics of permanence until such time
as the process of macroeconomic governance is required to respond to an explicitly anti-
machonomics style of policy-making.
______
Note: this post draws on the author’s recently published British Politics article, ‘George
Osborne’s Machonomics’.
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